Journal article icon

Journal article

Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks

Abstract:

This paper extends Levin's (2003) relational contract model by having not only the agent's cost of effort (agent's type), but also the value of that effort to the principal (principal's type) subject to i.i.d. shocks. When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types for multiple principal types, it is also pooled across those principal types. When optimal effort separates some agent types for multiple principal types, efforts of those agent types may be separated across principal types....

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Authors


More by this author
Department:
Economics
Role:
Author
More from this funder
Grant:
F08519B
Funding agency for:
Project
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume:
92
Pages:
122–137
Acceptance date:
2015-11-06
DOI:
ISSN:
0899-8256

Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP