Journal article
Hard and soft logical information
- Abstract:
- In this article I use the distinction between hard and soft information from the dynamic epistemic logic tradition to extend prior work on informational conceptions of logic to include non-monotonic consequence-relations. In particular, I defend the claim that at least some non-monotonic logics can be understood on the basis of soft or ‘belief-like’ logical information, and thereby question the orthodox view that all logical information is hard, ‘knowledge-like’, information.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 285.1KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/logcom/exx010
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Journal of Logic and Computation More from this journal
- Volume:
- 27
- Issue:
- 8
- Pages:
- 2505-2524
- Publication date:
- 2017-04-06
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-02-15
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1465-363X
- ISSN:
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0955-792X
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:680394
- UUID:
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uuid:c12dcc66-c641-4016-a8aa-7c72f5f6acba
- Local pid:
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pubs:680394
- Source identifiers:
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680394
- Deposit date:
-
2017-02-16
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- © Allo, 2017.
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- This is the author accepted manuscript following peer review version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: 10.1093/logcom/exx010
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