A stranger priority? Topics as the outer reaches of effective altruism

Thesis

This thesis examines three philosophical topics relevant to the project of identifying and acting on the most effective ways of doing good: anthropic reasoning, simulation arguments, and infinite ethics. These topics are unified in their potential to disrupt the empirical and normative assumptions underlying the most straightforward case for “strong longtermism” (that is, the view that positively influencing the long-term future is the key moral priority of our time). The first chapter examines the debate between the Self-Indication Assumption (“SIA”) and the Self-Sampling Assumption (“SSA”) in the context of anthropic reasoning – a debate with important implications for the size of humanity’s future (and, plausibly, of the universe itself). I argue that SIA is the superior view, and that the most prominent objection to SIA – the so-called “Presumptuous Philosopher” – is a bullet that we should consider biting. The second chapter formulates what I see as the strongest version of a “simulation argument” – that is, an argument that we should be highly confident that at least one of the following is true: either the ratio of simulated beings (“sims”) to non-simulated beings (“non-sims”) of certain types is not high, or we are sims. I distinguish between ways of making this argument that rely on empirical assumptions (for example, about the computational power available to advanced civilizations) and those that do not; I suggest that the latter are superior and independently forceful; and I explore some of the complications and uncertainties that the latter lead to. The third chapter surveys a variety of problems that infinities create for ethics, and it reflects on the implications of those problems. In particular, I argue that these problems puncture the dream of a simple, bullet- biting utilitarianism, and that they put pressure on some of the broader intuitions underlying common arguments for strong longtermism as well.

Authors: Carlsmith, J

• DOI: 10.5287/bodleian:wxdyx9RYX
• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: simulation argument; effective altruism; longtermism; anthropic reasoning; infinite ethics
• Subjects: Philosophy; Epistemology; Ethics