Working paper
Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces
- Abstract:
- Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.
- Publication status:
- Published
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 271.7KB, Terms of use)
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Authors
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2005-12-01
- Paper number:
- 251
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1144176
- Local pid:
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pubs:1144176
- Deposit date:
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2020-12-15
- ARK identifier:
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- Copyright date:
- 2005
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2005 The Author(s)
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