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Hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy in biology, neuroscience, and psychology

Abstract:
Is Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism compatible mechanistic science? In this essay I forge a rapprochement between Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism and the “new mechanist philosophy” in biology, neuroscience, and psychology by drawing attention to their shared commitments concerning multilevel organization, mechanisms, and teleology. Significantly, the new mechanists endorse organization realism (a touchstone of hylomorphism). Similarly, Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is committed to the reality of mechanisms or causal powers that produce, underlie, or maintain the behavior of (i) phenomena that are constituted through the (ii) spatial, temporal, and active organization of their (iii) component entities and (iv) component activities (the four hallmarks of the new mechanist philosophy). In the course of the essay I address potential disagreements between these two positions pertaining to emergence, downward causation, and teleology. I conclude that Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism should not been seen as fundamentally opposed to mechanisms; rather, hylomorphism provides a rigorous ontological framework that complements the insights of the new mechanist philosophy of biology, neuroscience and psychology.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Department:
Theology and Religion
Department:
Unknown
Role:
Author

Contributors

Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor


Publisher:
Routledge
Host title:
Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science
Issue:
12
Pages:
293-326
Series:
Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Publication date:
2017-10-16
ISBN-10:
0415792568
ISBN-13:
9780415792561


Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:1004170
UUID:
uuid:b86201a1-4dad-471b-840e-e23503bd60b4
Local pid:
pubs:1004170
Source identifiers:
1004170
Deposit date:
2019-05-30

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