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Journal article

Auditor lobbying on accounting standards

Abstract:

We examine how Big N auditors’ changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973–2006). In particular, we focus on the influence of auditors’ lobbying incentives arising from two basic factors: managing expected litigation and regulatory costs and catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP. We find evidence that auditor lobbying is driven by prevailing standards of litigation and regulatory scrutiny, but we f...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1561/108.00000027

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Social Sciences Division
Department:
Blavatnik School of Government
Roychowdhury, S More by this author
Publisher:
Now Publishers Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting Journal website
Volume:
3
Issue:
2
Pages:
291-331
Publication date:
2018-12-21
Acceptance date:
2018-01-24
DOI:
EISSN:
2380-5013
ISSN:
2164-5744
Pubs id:
pubs:975836
URN:
uri:b7dedeb6-e54d-4e78-8d59-e844a70a6ced
UUID:
uuid:b7dedeb6-e54d-4e78-8d59-e844a70a6ced
Local pid:
pubs:975836

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