Working paper
Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods
- Abstract:
-
We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and homogneity hold, negativity and symmetry properties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric and negative semidef...
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- Publication status:
- Published
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford Publisher's website
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2005-03-01
- Paper number:
- 226
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1144213
- Local pid:
- pubs:1144213
- Deposit date:
- 2020-12-15
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2005
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2005 The Author(s)
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