Working paper icon

Working paper

Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods

Abstract:

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and homogneity hold, negativity and symmetry properties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric and negative semidef...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


Publisher:
University of Oxford Publisher's website
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2005-03-01
Paper number:
226
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1144213
Local pid:
pubs:1144213
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP