First impression biases in the performing arts: taste-based discrimination and the value of blind auditioning

Working paper

I develop a game-theoretic framework to study the repercussions of an evaluator's bias against a specific group of applicants. The evaluator decides upfront between holding an informed or a blind audition. In the latter, the evaluator learns neither the applicant's ability nor the gender. I show that, above a threshold bias, the evaluator prefers a blind audition to provide high effort incentives exclusively for high-ability applicants. Consequently, committing to no information can be beneficial for the evaluator. I also show that a highly biased evaluator's preferences align with those of a highly able female. The introduction of performance uncertainty may lead to market failure or may render informed auditions more profitable, rationalising ability-targeting interventions. My results can explain why blind auditions have increased the probability of women being hired via taste-based discrimination and challenge explanations grounded in sta¬tistical discrimination.

Authors: Droege, J

• Publication status: Published
• Publisher: University of Oxford
• Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
• Publication date: 2019-12-13
• Paper number: 892
• Keywords: first impression; blind audition; bias; performance un-certainty; taste-based discrimination