Journal article
Common ownership, competition, and top management incentives
- Abstract:
- We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intraindustry and intrafirm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design, we document that managerial incentives are less performance sensitive in firms with more common ownership.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 2.9MB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1086/722414
Authors
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- Journal:
- Journal of Political Economy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 131
- Issue:
- 5
- Pages:
- 1294-1355
- Publication date:
- 2023-04-11
- Acceptance date:
- 2022-09-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1537-534X
- ISSN:
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0022-3808
- Language:
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English
- Pubs id:
-
1269686
- Local pid:
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pubs:1269686
- Deposit date:
-
2022-07-25
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The University of Chicago
- Copyright date:
- 2023
- Rights statement:
- © 2023 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from University of Chicago Press at https://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722414
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