Neurocomputational mechanisms of confidence in self and others

Journal article

Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one’s capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, this notable progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition – such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement, and highlight promising avenues for expanding the scope of metacognition research. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring

Authors: Bang, D; Moran, R; Daw, ND; Fleming, SM

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Nature Research
• Journal: Nature Communications
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 1
• Publication date: 2022-07-22
• DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-31674-w
• EISSN: 2041-1723
• ISSN: 2041-1723
• Language: English
• Keywords: Self-confidence; Low Confidence