Governance of non-bank systematically important financial institutions

Thesis

This thesis identifies the circumstances under which corporate governance regulation can help gain traction to minimise systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that local losses spread through the financial system and badly affect the financial system and the real economy. Excessive risk-taking by financial institutions can contribute to such systemic risk. Prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions leave corporate decision-makers with room for discretion to increase or decrease systemic risk. The incentives of these decision-makers are not necessarily aligned with minimising systemic risk. The thesis shows that this problem exists across different business models. More specifically, it identifies perverse incentives in the case of systemically important banks, CCPs, mutual funds, and hedge funds. The need for corporate governance regulation therefore lies in the inherent incompleteness of prudential regulation and supervision. Corporate governance regulation can help fill this gap by regulating the environment within which choices are made within these types of institutions.

The analysis has three steps. First, it characterises the systemic importance of financial-sector activities carried on outside the context of ‘banks’. The governance literature so far has focused on the ‘systemic externalities’ created by banks. However, our analysis shows that other non-bank SIFIs generate similar systemic externalities with socially harmful consequences. These systemic externalities are not considered by SIFIs when taking business decisions. In a second step, the thesis shows that prudential regulation and supervision are incomplete and leave room for governance regulation to fill in the gaps. The final step shows that a corporate governance framework focused solely on the interests of shareholders will have negative consequences for systemic stability. Given such divergence between the decision-makers’ and society’s interests, corporate governance regulation can complement the traditional prudential framework.

Authors: Morbee, K

• Type of award: DPhil
• Level of award: Doctoral
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English
• Keywords: asset managers; central counterparties; corporate governance; systemically important non-bank financial institutions; systemic risk
• Subjects: Finance; Law