Journal article

Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models.

Abstract:: This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games.

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APA Style

Binmore, K., Samuelson, L., & Young, P. (2003). Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models. Games and Economic Behavior, 45.

MLA Style

Binmore, K, et al. “Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 45, 2003.

Chicago Style

Binmore, K, L Samuelson, and P Young. 2003. “Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models.” Games and Economic Behavior 45.
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Authors

+ Binmore, K More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Samuelson, L More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Young, P More by this author

Role:: Author

Journal:: Games and Economic Behavior More from this journal
Volume:: 45
Publication date:: 2003-01-01
ISSN:: 0899-8256

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:af58d3ae-e309-45b8-9f6a-57054913dd89
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10733
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_af58d3aee30945b89f6a57054913dd89

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 2003

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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