How to be an epistemic constitutivist

Journal article

Constitutivism has been widely discussed in both metaethics and epistemology. In this paper I argue that it has been misunderstood in a number of significant ways. I argue that a hallmark of constitutive norms is a particular kind of escapability - what I will call Jurisdictional Escapability. And that jurisdictional escapability is key to whether constitutivism is a good fit or a potentially awkward one, in a given domain.

Jurisdictional escapability is often run together with a different kind of escapability - which I will call Normative Escapability. But clearly distinguishing these, has significant upshots both for the normative landscape generally, and for constitutivism. First, it reveals a way in which constitutivism is a particularly good fit for epistemic norms, and not such a good fit for moral ones. Second, it reveals that constitutivism is not, as is often thought, an antirealist position, and is in fact entirely compatible with robust realism. Third, it introduces a new dimension of precision into the normative landscape.

 

Authors: Hanson, L

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Journal: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
• Volume: 124
• Issue: 3
• Publication date: 2025-08-25
• Acceptance date: 2025-02-03
• DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoaf010
• EISSN: 1467-9264
• ISSN: 0066-7374
• Language: English