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Journal article

Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction.

Abstract:

We analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can release, without observing, certain additional signals that affect the buyers’ valuations. Our main result is that in the expected revenue maximizing mechanism, the seller makes available all the information that she can, and her expected revenue is the same as it would be if she could o...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00442.x
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Journal:
Review of Economic Studies More from this journal
Volume:
74
Issue:
3
Pages:
705 - 731
Publication date:
2007-01-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0034-6527
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:ace6b193-2788-417e-b331-3b72c0be23ed
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14790
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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