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The welfare economics of optional water metering with asymmetric information.

Abstract:

The paper develops a model of decentralized metering decisions when selective metering is socially optimal. Households choose between two-part tariffs. Decentralization achieves social efficiency when the regulator, who knows household characteristics, gives householdspecific compensation (via a reduction in the lump-sum charge on choosing to have a meter), while allowing for the cost of metering. Relative to the status quo of no metering the full-information scheme provides a Pareto improvem...

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Volume:
273
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2006-01-01
URN:
uuid:ac9d3d43-ff0e-4fd5-ba0b-a1c217622e8e
Local pid:
ora:1312
Language:
English

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