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Fairness and Desert in Tournaments.

Abstract:

We develop a model to describe the behavior of agents who care about receiving their “just deserts” in competitive situations. In particular we analyze the strategic behavior of two identical desert-motivated agents in a rank-order tournament. Each agent is assumed to be loss averse about an endogenous and meritocratically determined reference point that represents her perceived entitlement. Sufficiently strong desert concerns render the usual symmetric equilibrium unstable or nonexistent and...

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Volume:
279
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2006-01-01
URN:
uuid:aba30449-d8b4-4af6-9e26-4aac4716be4d
Local pid:
ora:1318

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