An instrumental legal moralism

Book section : Chapter

Many writers defend or attack the position nowadays known as legal moralism. According to the most common formulation, legal moralists endorse the following thesis: the fact that φing is morally wrong is a reason to criminalize φing. This chapter considers a different kind of legal moralism, here called instrumental legal moralism (ILM). According to ILM: the fact that criminalizing φing will probably prevent moral wrongs is a reason to criminalize φing. Section I draws some relevant distinctions. In doing so, it clarifies the difference between ILM and the act-centred legal moralism (ALM) commonly discussed in the literature. Sections II–IV consider two prominent arguments for ALM: the retributivist argument, offered by Michael Moore, and the answerability argument, offered by Antony Duff. The chapter shows that, contrary to the intentions of these authors, both arguments in fact support ILM.

Authors: Edwards, J

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Host title: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 3
• Volume: 3
• Pages: 153-189
• Chapter number: 5
• Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law
• Publication date: 2018-09-01
• Acceptance date: 2017-08-15
• DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198828174.003.0005
• EISBN: 9780191866845
• ISBN: 9780198828174
• Language: English
• Keywords: criminalization; answerability; legal moralism; moral wrongdoing; retributivism
• Subtype: Chapter