Working paper
Scandal, protection, and recovery in political cabinets
- Abstract:
-
Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister's exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes work against the objective of encouraging activism: it makes a minister's position more valuable to him and hence can encourage him to sit tight by moderat...
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- Publication status:
- Published
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford Publisher's website
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2005-06-01
- Paper number:
- 237
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1144191
- Local pid:
- pubs:1144191
- Deposit date:
- 2020-12-15
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2005
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2005 The Author(s)
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