Journal article
Permissive metaepistemology
- Abstract:
- Recent objections to epistemic permissivism have a metaepistemic flavor. Impermissivists argue that their view best accounts for connections between rationality, planning and deference. Impermissivism is also taken to best explain the value of rational belief and normative assessment. These objections pose a series of metaepistemic explanatory challenges for permissivism. In this paper, I illustrate how permissivists might meet their explanatory burdens by developing two permissivist metaepistemic views which fare well against the explanatory challenges.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 190.5KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/mind/fzy044
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Mind More from this journal
- Volume:
- 128
- Issue:
- 511
- Pages:
- 907-926
- Publication date:
- 2018-10-16
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-09-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1460-2113
- ISSN:
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0026-4423
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1190027
- Local pid:
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pubs:1190027
- Deposit date:
-
2021-08-08
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Thorstad
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- © Thorstad 2018
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy044
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