Journal article
How should we understand the balancing view of ought?
- Abstract:
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Thomas Schmidt argues that a widely held combination of views about reasons and ought—the Balancing View of Ought and the claim that reasons against ϕ are reasons for not-ϕ—is extensionally adequate only if it is complemented by two principles of reasons transmission. This article presents five problems for Schmidt’s package of views and defends a rival package of views—a version of the Balancing View and the claim that reasons against ϕ are reasons that bear on ϕ with negative weight—that friends of the Balancing View should prefer.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 309.0KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1086/735392
Authors
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- Journal:
- Ethics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 135
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 689-703
- Publication date:
- 2025-07-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2024-11-25
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1539-297X
- ISSN:
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0014-1704
- Language:
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English
- Pubs id:
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2345564
- Local pid:
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pubs:2345564
- Deposit date:
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2025-12-05
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The University of Chicago
- Copyright date:
- 2025
- Rights statement:
- © 2025 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- The author accepted manuscript (AAM) of this paper has been made available under the University of Oxford's Open Access Publications Policy, and a CC BY public copyright licence has been applied.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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