Journal article
Propositionalism
- Abstract:
- Propositionalism is the claim that all logical relations can be captured by propositional logic. It is usually regarded as obviously false, because propositional logic seems too weak to capture the rich logical structure of language. I show that there is a clear sense in which propositional logic can match first-order logic, by producing formalizations that (i) are valid iff their first-order counterparts are, and (ii) also respect grammatical form as the propositionalist construes it. I explain the real reason propositionalism fails, which is more subtle and more interesting.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 307.8KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.5840/jphil2021118830
Authors
- Publisher:
- Journal of Philosophy
- Journal:
- Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 118
- Issue:
- 8
- Pages:
- 430-449
- Publication date:
- 2021-08-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2021-01-13
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1939-8549
- ISSN:
-
0022-362X
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1170855
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1170855
- Deposit date:
-
2021-04-08
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
- Copyright date:
- 2021
- Rights statement:
- © 2021 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
- Notes:
-
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. at https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118830
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record