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Consciousness ain’t all that

Abstract:

Most philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness underlies, or at any rate makes a large contribution, to moral considerability. This paper argues that many such accounts invoke question-begging arguments. Moreover, they’re unable to explain apparent differences in moral status across and within different species. In the light of these problems, I argue that we ought to take very seriously a view according to which moral considerability is grounded in functional properties. Phenomenal consciousness may be sufficient for having a moral value, but it may not be necessary, and it may contribute relatively little to our overall considerability.

Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s12152-024-09559-0

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-5679-1986


More from this funder
Grant:
CAVAA – 101071178
Programme:
Counterfactual Assessment and Valuation for Awareness Architecture


Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Neuroethics More from this journal
Volume:
17
Issue:
2
Article number:
21
Publication date:
2024-04-24
Acceptance date:
2024-04-16
DOI:
EISSN:
1874-5504
ISSN:
1874-5490


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1993397
Local pid:
pubs:1993397
Deposit date:
2024-05-29

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