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Multiwinner candidacy games

Abstract:
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multiwinner elections, where the goal is to select a fixed-size committee of candidates, rather than a single winner. We examine the existence and properties of Nash equilibria in the resulting class of games, under various voting rules and voter preference structures.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publication website:
https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/3398761.3398873

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author

Publisher:
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Host title:
AAMAS '20: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages:
957-965
Publication date:
2020-05-05
Acceptance date:
2020-01-15
Event title:
19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020)
Event location:
Auckland, New Zealand
Event website:
https://aamas2020.conference.auckland.ac.nz/
Event start date:
2020-05-09
Event end date:
2020-05-13
EISSN:
1558-2914
ISSN:
1548-8403
ISBN:
9781450375184

Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1148905
Local pid:
pubs:1148905
Deposit date:
2021-04-19
ARK identifier:

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