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Complexity of stability in trading networks

Abstract:
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks—multi-sided matching markets with bilateral contracts and without transferable utility—under the assumption of full substitutability of agents’ preferences. It is known that outcomes that satisfy trail stability always exist and can be found in linear time. However, we show that the existence of stable outcomes—immune to deviations by arbitrary sets of agents—is an 𝖭𝖯-hard problem in trading networks. We also show that even verifying whether a given outcome is stable is 𝖭𝖯-hard in trading networks.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00182-022-00833-0

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
St Catherine's College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-6570-1903


Publisher:
Springer Nature
Journal:
International Journal of Game Theory More from this journal
Volume:
52
Issue:
3
Pages:
629-648
Publication date:
2023-04-08
Acceptance date:
2022-09-19
DOI:
EISSN:
1432-1270
ISSN:
0020-7276


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1343460
Local pid:
pubs:1343460
Deposit date:
2023-07-25

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