Journal article
The market for ESG ratings
- Abstract:
- We present a model of competition between ESG raters who acquire information about multiple unrelated categories and sell ratings. Raters specializing in different categories maximizes the amount of information transmitted and surplus, and can be the equilibrium outcome. When investors place a high value on ESG performance across multiple categories, the unique equilibrium is for the raters to generalize – splitting their effort among the categories, resulting in less informative ratings. Greenwashing by firms can make generalization the only equilibrium. We also demonstrate that specialization maximizes ratings disagreement and, thus, empirical measures of disagreement may be poor measures of surplus.
- Publication status:
- Accepted
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 2.3MB, Terms of use)
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Authors
- Publisher:
- Wiley
- Journal:
- Journal of Finance More from this journal
- Acceptance date:
- 2025-12-15
- EISSN:
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1540-6261
- ISSN:
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0022-1082
- Language:
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English
- Pubs id:
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2350489
- Local pid:
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pubs:2350489
- Deposit date:
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2025-12-16
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Azarmsa and Shapiro
- Copyright date:
- 2025
- Rights statement:
- ©2025 The Authors.
- Notes:
- The author accepted manuscript (AAM) of this paper has been made available under the University of Oxford's Open Access Publications Policy, and a CC BY public copyright licence has been applied.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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