Conference icon

Conference

Robust equilibria in mean-payoff games

Abstract:

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A (k, t)-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size k can improve the payoff of one its member by deviating, and no coalition of size t can decrease the payoff of other players. While deciding whether there exists such equilibria is undecidable in general, we suggest algorithms for two meaningful restrictions on the complexity of strategies. The first res...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-662-49630-5_13

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science
Publisher:
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg Publisher's website
Volume:
9634
Pages:
217-233
Series:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publication date:
2016
DOI:
ISSN:
0302-9743
URN:
uuid:97282fa9-0954-4768-b203-13af7cf0981a
Source identifiers:
606343
Local pid:
pubs:606343
ISBN:
978-3-662-49629-9

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP