Journal article
The instrumental rule
- Abstract:
- Properly understood, the instrumental rule says to take means that actually suffice for my end, not, as is nearly universally assumed, to intend means that I believe are necessary for my end. This alternative explains everything the standard interpretation can—and more, including grounding certain correctness conditions for exercises of our will unexplained by the standard interpretation.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 150.7KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/apa.2020.3
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association More from this journal
- Volume:
- 6
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 444-462
- Publication date:
- 2020-08-28
- Acceptance date:
- 2020-01-16
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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2053-4485
- ISSN:
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2053-4477
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:1083138
- UUID:
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uuid:97072934-d809-4f7f-a3a0-4fac7faf5a18
- Local pid:
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pubs:1083138
- Source identifiers:
-
1083138
- Deposit date:
-
2020-01-17
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- American Philosophical Association
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © American Philosophical Association 2020.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Cambridge University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2020.3
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