Journal article icon

Journal article

Collusion in uniform-price auctions: Experimental evidence and implications for Treasury auctions

Abstract:

In uniform-price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction. We provide experimental evidence that, in uniform-price auctions, non-binding pre-play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes. On the other hand, regardless of the opportunities for communication, in discriminatory-auction experim...

Expand abstract

Actions


Authors


Publication date:
1996-01-01
URN:
uuid:96711f01-1488-4ad8-8cd5-7bd4b269c247
Local pid:
oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1133

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP