Journal article
The rule of justice
- Abstract:
- Law can secure some aspects of justice in a political community. Yet the law should not generally prohibit injustices by private persons or give recourse against them. That would be tyranny. It may seem that the law should, by contrast, prohibit all injustices in the conduct of government, and give recourse against them. In this article I argue against that seemingly attractive idea. I do so by reference to three kinds of public injustice: in voting, in legislation, and in adjudication. I claim that those kinds of public injustice are not generally matters for the law. Preventing or repairing injustice is not enough to justify legal prohibitions or legal recourse against wrongs. The justification of legal measures depends on a political principle: that the law ought to make the political community a good one.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 383.2KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/icon/moac109
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- International Journal of Constitutional Law More from this journal
- Volume:
- 20
- Issue:
- 5
- Pages:
- 1851–1873
- Publication date:
- 2023-02-06
- Acceptance date:
- 2022-11-28
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1474-2659
- ISSN:
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1474-2640
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1310664
- Local pid:
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pubs:1310664
- Deposit date:
-
2022-11-29
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Timothy Endicott
- Copyright date:
- 2022
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s) 2023. Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law. All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icon/moac109
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