Journal article
Inferential transitions
- Abstract:
- This paper provides a naturalistic account of inference. We posit that the core of inference is constituted by bare inferential transitions (BITs), transitions between discursive mental representations guided by rules built into the architecture of cognitive systems. In further developing the concept of BITs, we provide an account of what Boghossian [2014] calls ‘taking’—that is, the appreciation of the rule that guides an inferential transition. We argue that BITs are sufficient for implicit taking, and then, to analyse explicit taking, we posit rich inferential transitions (RITs), which are transitions that the subject is disposed to endorse.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 213.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1080/00048402.2017.1358754
Authors
+ Professional Staff Congress - City University of New York
More from this funder
- Grant:
- 67331-00 45
- Publisher:
- Routledge
- Journal:
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 96
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 532-547
- Publication date:
- 2017-08-27
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-07-16
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1471-6828
- ISSN:
-
0004-8402
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:826689
- UUID:
-
uuid:9452c6ed-ba35-451c-9ac8-6c0bb014af29
- Local pid:
-
pubs:826689
- Source identifiers:
-
826689
- Deposit date:
-
2018-04-17
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Australasian Association of Philosophy
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2017 Australasian Association of Philosophy. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Routledge at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1358754
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