Journal article
Come together: firm boundaries and delegation
- Abstract:
- We jointly study firm boundaries and the allocation of decision rights within them by confronting an incomplete-contracts model with data on vertical integration and delegation for thousands of firms around the world. Integration has an option value: it confers authority to delegate or centralize decision rights, depending on who can best solve problems that arise in the course of an uncertain production process. In line with the model’s predictions, we find that firms are more likely to integrate suppliers that produce more valuable inputs and operate in industries with more dispersed productivity, and that firms delegate more decisions to integrated suppliers that produce more valuable inputs and operate in more productive industries.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 461.6KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/jeea/jvad027
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Journal of the European Economic Association More from this journal
- Volume:
- 22
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 34–72
- Publication date:
- 2023-05-11
- Acceptance date:
- 2023-01-28
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1542-4774
- ISSN:
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1542-4766
- Language:
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English
- Pubs id:
-
1350515
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1350515
- Deposit date:
-
2023-12-08
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Alfaro et al
- Copyright date:
- 2023
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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