Journal article
Costly interviews
- Abstract:
- In this paper, we show how the interaction between costly screening and competition in decentralized markets may prevent efficient matching. We examine this phenomenon in a simple dynamic model of a professional labor market, where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability. Inefficiencies arise when a firm decides not to interview potentially able candidates since it infers that sufficiently good candidates will be hired by more productive firms. This effect is robust to changes in the information structure of the market, but it can be mitigated by subsidizing screening costs.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 160.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.12.001
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- International Journal of Industrial Organization More from this journal
- Volume:
- 45
- Pages:
- 10–15
- Publication date:
- 2015-12-30
- Acceptance date:
- 2015-12-04
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0167-7187
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:599233
- UUID:
-
uuid:935e1512-5c3b-4540-9cd5-6679b14e5e68
- Local pid:
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pubs:599233
- Source identifiers:
-
599233
- Deposit date:
-
2016-02-05
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier BV
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Rights statement:
- Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.12.001
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