Journal article

Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run.

Abstract:: The long-run behavior of economic and biological processes is often dramatically altered when stochastic influences are taken into account. In fact, the smaller the noise, the more drastic the change can be. This seemingly paradoxical point is illustrated with the evolution of cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.

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APA Style

Young, H., & Foster, D. (1991). Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run. Games and Economic Behavior, 3(1), 145–156.

MLA Style

Young, H., and D. Foster. “Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 3, no. 1, Elsevier, 1991, pp. 145–56.

Chicago Style

Young, H, and D Foster. 1991. “Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run.” Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1): 145–56.
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Publisher copy:: 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90010-C

Authors

+ Young, H More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Foster, D More by this author

Role:: Author

Publisher:: Elsevier
Journal:: Games and Economic Behavior More from this journal
Volume:: 3
Issue:: 1
Pages:: 145 - 156
Publication date:: 1991-01-01
DOI:: 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90010-C
ISSN:: 0899-8256

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:923941db-4b81-421d-b256-c21f9d503b67
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10741
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 1991

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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