Book section : Chapter
Evidence
- Abstract:
- Richard Swinburne argues for a doxastic theory of evidence and of having it. That is, evidence consists in beliefs and having p as evidence consists in having the basic belief that p. At least, that is the core case. Beliefs, though, vary in strength, and Swinburne thinks that even inclinations to believe should count as evidence. He proposes that the probability of a proposition varies in proportion to our inclination to believe it.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 93.2KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Host title:
- Evidentialism and its Discontents
- Pages:
- 195-206
- Chapter number:
- 12
- Publication date:
- 2011-01-01
- DOI:
- ISBN:
- 9780199563500
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Subtype:
-
Chapter
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:617748
- UUID:
-
uuid:918f6c9a-28f4-4ca1-860f-1847bb049201
- Local pid:
-
pubs:617748
- Source identifiers:
-
617748
- Deposit date:
-
2016-04-25
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Richard Swinburne
- Copyright date:
- 2011
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the chapter. The final version is available online from Oxford University Press at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001
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