Conference item
Synthesis of code-reuse attacks from p-code programs
- Abstract:
- We present a new method for automatically synthesizing code-reuse attacks—for example, using Return Oriented Programming—based on mechanized formal logic. Our method reasons about machine code via abstraction to the p-code intermediate language of Ghidra, a well-established software reverse-engineering framework. This allows it to be applied to binaries of essentially any architecture, and provides certain technical advantages. We define a formal model of a fragment of p-code in propositional logic, enabling analysis by automated reasoning algorithms. We then synthesize code-reuse attacks by identifying selections of gadgets that can emulate a given p-code reference program. This enables our method to scale well, in both reference program and gadget library size, and facilitates integration with external tools. Our method matches or exceeds the success rate of state-of-the-art ROP chain synthesis methods while providing improved runtime performance.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 477.5KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publication website:
- https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3766078.3766099
Authors
- Publisher:
- Association for Computing Machinery
- Host title:
- SEC '25: Proceedings of the 34th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium
- Pages:
- 395 - 411
- Publication date:
- 2025-09-08
- Acceptance date:
- 2025-01-24
- Event title:
- 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX 2025)
- Event location:
- Seattle, Washington, USA
- Event website:
- https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25
- Event start date:
- 2025-08-13
- Event end date:
- 2025-08-15
- ISBN:
- 9781939133526
- Language:
-
English
- Pubs id:
-
2080410
- Local pid:
-
pubs:2080410
- Deposit date:
-
2025-01-25
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The USENIX Association.
- Copyright date:
- 2025
- Rights statement:
- © 2025 The USENIX Association.
- Notes:
-
This paper was presented at the 34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX 2025), 13th-15th August 2025, Seattle, Washington, USA.
The author accepted manuscript (AAM) of this paper has been made available under the University of Oxford's Open Access Publications Policy, and a CC BY public copyright licence has been applied.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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