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Competition in posted prices with stochastic discounts

Abstract:
We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets in which sellers use the marketing practice of couponing. Even though bargainers receive reductions off the posted prices, the potential to discount dampens competitive pressure in the market, thus raising all prices and increasing profits. Welfare falls because of the stochastic nature of the discounts, which generates some misallocation of products to consumers. Stochastic discounts facilitate collusion by reducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1111/ecoj.12294

Authors

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Nuffield College
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Wiley
Journal:
Economic Journal More from this journal
Volume:
126
Issue:
594
Pages:
1528-1570
Publication date:
2016-04-29
Acceptance date:
2015-04-10
DOI:
EISSN:
1468-0297
ISSN:
0013-0133


Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
Pubs id:
620544
UUID:
uuid:8ea03344-c54b-4718-8d46-3ad807b6a728
Local pid:
pubs:620544
Deposit date:
2015-04-30
ARK identifier:

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