Journal article
Competition in posted prices with stochastic discounts
- Abstract:
- We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly and of markets in which sellers use the marketing practice of couponing. Even though bargainers receive reductions off the posted prices, the potential to discount dampens competitive pressure in the market, thus raising all prices and increasing profits. Welfare falls because of the stochastic nature of the discounts, which generates some misallocation of products to consumers. Stochastic discounts facilitate collusion by reducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 280.8KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/ecoj.12294
Authors
- Publisher:
- Wiley
- Journal:
- Economic Journal More from this journal
- Volume:
- 126
- Issue:
- 594
- Pages:
- 1528-1570
- Publication date:
- 2016-04-29
- Acceptance date:
- 2015-04-10
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1468-0297
- ISSN:
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0013-0133
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- Pubs id:
-
620544
- UUID:
-
uuid:8ea03344-c54b-4718-8d46-3ad807b6a728
- Local pid:
-
pubs:620544
- Deposit date:
-
2015-04-30
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Royal Economic Society
- Copyright date:
- 2015
- Rights statement:
- © 2015 Royal Economic Society
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Wiley at https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12294
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