Journal article
Kant’s transcendental deduction, non-conceptualism, and the fitness-for-purpose objection
- Abstract:
- The subject of this article is a powerful objection to the non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories. Part of the purpose of the deduction is to refute the sort of scepticism according to which there are no objects of empirical intuition that instantiate the categories. But if the non-conceptualist interpretation is correct, it does not follow from what Kant is arguing in the transcendental deduction that this sort of scepticism is false. This article explains and assesses a number of possible responses to this objection.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 294.4KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/s1369415417000383
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Kantian Review More from this journal
- Volume:
- 23
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 65-88
- Publication date:
- 2018-02-23
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-05-15
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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2044-2394
- ISSN:
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1369-4154
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:1038789
- UUID:
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uuid:8e575028-85e1-4515-91ad-cc36fb158c4a
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1038789
- Source identifiers:
-
1038789
- Deposit date:
-
2019-08-06
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Kantian Review
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- Copyright © Kantian Review 2018. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Cambridge University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000383
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