Journal article icon

Journal article

When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action.

Abstract:

This paper studies collective-action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork. A leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between equilibria in which a team successfully provides, and an equilibrium in which the collective action fails. A full characterization of long-run play reveals the determinants of success; these include the correlation...

Expand abstract

Actions


Journal:
Review of Economic Studies More from this journal
Volume:
75
Publication date:
2008-01-01
ISSN:
0034-6527
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:8d79d050-49c4-4fa6-b675-bea05851e2ab
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11400
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP