Working paper icon

Working paper

The case for intervening in bankers' pay

Abstract:

This paper studies banker remuneration in a competitive market for banker talent. I model, and then calibrate, the default risk of the banks generated by investments and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. But competition for bankers generates a negative externality driving up rival banks' default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured li...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2011-02-01
Paper number:
532
Keywords:
Pubs id:
898509
Local pid:
pubs:898509
Deposit date:
2020-12-14

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP