Working paper
The case for intervening in bankers' pay
- Abstract:
-
This paper studies banker remuneration in a competitive market for banker talent. I model, and then calibrate, the default risk of the banks generated by investments and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. But competition for bankers generates a negative externality driving up rival banks' default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured li...
Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Published
Actions
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford Publisher's website
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2011-02-01
- Paper number:
- 532
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
898509
- Local pid:
- pubs:898509
- Deposit date:
- 2020-12-14
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2011
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2011 The Author(s)
Metrics
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record