Journal article
Gaming performance fees by portfolio managers.
- Abstract:
-
We show that it is very difficult to devise performance-based compensation contracts that reward portfolio managers who generate excess returns while screening out managers who cannot generate such returns. Theoretical bounds are derived on the amount of fee manipulation that is possible under various performance contracts. We show that recent proposals to reform compensation practices, such as postponing bonuses and instituting clawback provisions, will not eliminate opportunities to game th...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- MIT Press
- Journal:
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Volume:
- 125
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 1435 - 1458
- Publication date:
- 2010-11-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0033-5533
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:8ae396a5-95bb-461f-8407-8ac34a306264
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15003
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-15
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- Copyright date:
- 2010
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