Journal article icon

Journal article

Gaming performance fees by portfolio managers.

Abstract:

We show that it is very difficult to devise performance-based compensation contracts that reward portfolio managers who generate excess returns while screening out managers who cannot generate such returns. Theoretical bounds are derived on the amount of fee manipulation that is possible under various performance contracts. We show that recent proposals to reform compensation practices, such as postponing bonuses and instituting clawback provisions, will not eliminate opportunities to game th...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1435

Authors


Journal:
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Volume:
125
Issue:
4
Publication date:
2010-11-05
DOI:
URN:
uuid:8ae396a5-95bb-461f-8407-8ac34a306264
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:15003
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP