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Nash Bargaining, Credible Bargaining and Efficiency Wages in a Matching Model for the US.

Abstract:

This paper incorporates Nash bargaining, credible bargaining and efficiency wages as special cases of an over-arching model of wage determination in a matching model that is used to assess econometrically how well each fits US data. With Nash bargaining, estimates for worker bargaining power and the value of non-work activity are almost identical to those calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). However, the over-identifying restrictions are overwhelmingly rejected statistically, as the...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2010-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:8a7ec1e7-bb3a-4f4f-8708-49876a3e527d
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14993
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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