Reconceptualising the Psychological Theory of Generics

Journal article

Generics have historically proven difficult to analyse using the tools of formal semantics. In this paper, I argue that an influential theory of the meaning of generics due to Sarah-Jane Leslie, the Psychological Theory of Generics, is best interpreted not as a theory of their meaning, but as a theory of the psychological heuristics that we use to judge whether or not generics are true. I argue that Leslie’s methodology is not well-suited to producing a theory of the meaning of generics, since it takes speakers’ judgments at face value and ignores the non-semantic factors that might affect these judgments. Leslie’s theory therefore overfits the data of our linguistic intuitions. I present a reconceptualised version of the Psychological Theory of Generics as a theory of how heuristics affect our judgements of the truth values of generics and discuss the application of this reconceptualised theory to some of the puzzles posed by generics, including their apparent content-sensitivity, their inferential asymmetry and their association with stereotyping and prejudice.

Authors: Ralston, T

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Springer
• Journal: Philosophical Studies
• Volume: 181
• Issue: 11
• Pages: 2973-2995
• Publication date: 2024-10-18
• Acceptance date: 2024-09-27
• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02242-3
• EISSN: 1573-0883
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• Language: English
• Keywords: Semantics; Generics; Heuristics and biases; Psychological Theory of Generics