Working paper
The Hedge Fund Game.
- Abstract:
-
This paper examines theoretical properties of incentive contracts in the hedge fund industry. We show that it is very difficult to structure incentive payments that distinguish between unskilled managers, who cannot generate excess market returns, and skilled managers who can deliver such returns. Under any incentive scheme that does not levy penalties for underperformance, managers with no investment skill can game the system so as to earn (in expectation) the same amount per dollar of funds...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Nuffield College (University of Oxford)
- Series:
- Economics Working Papers
- Publication date:
- 2008-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:887cdf78-79c7-4b91-8754-1d8290bff750
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11971
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 2008
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