Efficient causation in Hume

Abstract:: There is considerable scholarly division regarding the fundamentals of Hume’s account of efficient causation. The majority opinion reads him as offering an austere metaphysics wherein efficient causation consists in regularities of a certain kind, whereas a minority read Hume as circumscribing severely what we can understand of the causal relation. Without deciding this issue, this chapter draws attention to the fact that on either reading Hume’s view starkly contrasts with the metaphysically rich discussions that preceded A Treatise of Human Nature. There is an investigation here of the grounds for Hume’s radical break from his predecessors. These grounds are located not in a simple application of meaning-empiricism, but instead in a “subject-naturalism” that focuses on the explanation of the nature of our causal inference in order to illuminate what we understand by causation. The chapter closes with a discussion of Thomas Reid’s reaction to Hume.

Files:: Kail-Peter-Humes-Contradictions.pdf

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Keywords:: SBTMR

Hume

naturalism

philosophy

treatise of human nature

Reid

causal inference

efficient causation
Pubs id:: pubs:974874
UUID:: uuid:834a9602-26e8-4bca-8e0b-0c3638b0bce0
Local pid:: pubs:974874
Source identifiers:: 974874
Deposit date:: 2019-02-20
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_834a960226e84bca8e0b0c3638b0bce0

Copyright holder:: The Royal Institute of Philosophy
Notes:: © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2016. This is the accepted manuscript version of the record. The final version of the record is available from Oxford University Press at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199782185.003.0012

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