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Rejecting epiphobia

Abstract:
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s11229-020-02911-w

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author


Publisher:
Springer
Journal:
Synthese More from this journal
Volume:
199
Pages:
2773-2791
Publication date:
2020-10-21
Acceptance date:
2020-10-10
DOI:
EISSN:
1573-0964
ISSN:
0039-7857


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1136506
Local pid:
pubs:1136506
Deposit date:
2020-10-08
ARK identifier:

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