Journal article
Causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence
- Abstract:
- According to one conception of strong emergence, strongly emergent properties are nomologically necessitated by their base properties and have novel causal powers relative to them. In this paper, I raise a difficulty for this conception of strong emergence, arguing that these two features (i.e., nomological necessitation and causal novelty) are incompatible. Instead of presenting this as an objection to the friends of strong emergence, I argue that this indicates that there are distinct varieties of strong emergence: causal emergence and epiphenomenal emergence. I then explore the prospects of emergentism with this distinction in the background.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, 382.6KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s10670-018-0055-z
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer Verlag
- Journal:
- Erkenntnis More from this journal
- Volume:
- 85
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 891–904
- Publication date:
- 2018-08-23
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-08-16
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1572-8420
- ISSN:
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0165-0106
- Language:
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English
- Pubs id:
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pubs:909548
- UUID:
-
uuid:7db837ec-4ab7-4999-a93f-1a0b86a54938
- Local pid:
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pubs:909548
- Source identifiers:
-
909548
- Deposit date:
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2018-08-23
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Baysan
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- © The Author 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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