How wrong is Paternalism?

Journal article

In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concerning an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions. I demonstrate that this assumption cannot be grounded by wellbeing reasons, and that autonomy-based reasons of non-interference also cannot adequately explain the difference. Following this, I propose that the difference in the reasons related to an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions can be explained by the value of holding a person responsible for his choices. Nonetheless, this does not result in paternalistic behavior that interferes with autonomy being all things considered wrong. Instead, I show that the reason to hold a person responsible for a diminution of his wellbeing does not necessarily defeat the wellbeing reasons that count in favor of paternalistic behavior.

Authors: Birks, D

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Brill Academic Publishers
• Journal: Journal of Moral Philosophy
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 136 – 163
• Publication date: 2018-04-01
• Acceptance date: 2017-07-27
• DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20170006
• EISSN: 1745-5243
• ISSN: 1740-4681
• Keywords: responsibility-catering prioritarianism; paternalism; wellbeing; autonomy