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Aggregating extended preferences

Abstract:

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Author's Original

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s11098-016-0748-6

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Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy Faculty
Lederman, H More by this author
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands Publisher's website
Journal:
Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition Journal website
Volume:
174
Issue:
5
Pages:
1163–1190
Publication date:
2016-09-02
Acceptance date:
2016-02-27
DOI:
ISSN:
1573-0883
Pubs id:
pubs:629672
URN:
uri:7c7b2ad4-6cd0-4552-87ed-deeeec0f98e0
UUID:
uuid:7c7b2ad4-6cd0-4552-87ed-deeeec0f98e0
Local pid:
pubs:629672
Keywords:

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