Journal article
Aggregating extended preferences
- Abstract:
- An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Author's original, pdf, 501.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s11098-016-0748-6
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer Netherlands
- Journal:
- Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition More from this journal
- Volume:
- 174
- Issue:
- 5
- Pages:
- 1163–1190
- Publication date:
- 2016-09-02
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-02-27
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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1573-0883
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:629672
- UUID:
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uuid:7c7b2ad4-6cd0-4552-87ed-deeeec0f98e0
- Local pid:
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pubs:629672
- Deposit date:
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2016-09-06
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
-
This is a
pre-print version of a journal article published by Springer in Philosophical Studies on 2016-09-02, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0748-6
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