Journal article

On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games.

Abstract:: It is shown by example that learning rules of the fictitious play type fail to converge in certain kinds of coordination games. Variants of fictitious play in which past actions are eventually forgotten and that incorporate small stochastic perturbations are better behaved for this class of games: over the long run, players coordinate with probability one.

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APA Style

Foster, D., & Young, H. (1998). On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 25.

MLA Style

Foster, D, and H Young. “On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 25, 1998.

Chicago Style

Foster, D, and H Young. 1998. “On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 25.
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Authors

+ Foster, D More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Young, H More by this author

Role:: Author

Journal:: Games and Economic Behavior More from this journal
Volume:: 25
Publication date:: 1998-01-01
ISSN:: 0899-8256

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:7b4f2365-57fb-4434-84ed-7fcd9cd5ca59
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10735
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_7b4f236557fb443484ed7fcd9cd5ca59

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 1998

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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