Journal article
Doxastic wrongs, non-spurious generalizations and particularized beliefs
- Abstract:
- According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender (or sexual orientation, disability, and so on) and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on the truth-value or valence of beliefs.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, 192.4KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1093/arisoc/aoab015
Authors
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- Journal:
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society More from this journal
- Volume:
- 122
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 47-69
- Publication date:
- 2022-01-21
- Acceptance date:
- 2021-12-09
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1467-9264
- ISSN:
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0066-7374
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1222785
- Local pid:
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pubs:1222785
- Deposit date:
-
2021-12-09
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Cécile Fabre
- Copyright date:
- 2022
- Rights statement:
- © 2022 The Aristotelian Society. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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